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Abstract 
 In this paper, we review the economic effects of intellectual property rights and 
specifically address the economics of the patent system. The production and dissemina-
tion of new knowledge is fraught with market failures because knowledge is a public 
good. Patents provide a second-best solution to the resulting appropriability problem. We 
review the main benefits and costs of the patent system, focusing on the role that patents 
play in providing incentives for innovation, in promoting the dissemination of knowl-
edge, and in helping technology transfer and commercialization of new technology. From 
a more normative perspective, we address the questions of what the features of an opti-
mal patent system are and whether the patent system is socially desirable. We examine 
the problem of the optimal length and scope of patent protection, both for the case of a 
single innovation and for the richer case of cumulative innovations. Finally, we review 
the issues related to how the patent system influences the market structure and research 
and development investments. 
 
Key words:  innovation, intellectual property rights, monopoly, patents, research and 
development. 
 
 
 
  
 
THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS: AN OVERVIEW 
Introduction 
Patents are perhaps the most important legal instruments for protecting intellectual 
property rights. A patent confers to an inventor the sole right to exclude others from 
economically exploiting the innovation for a limited time (20 years from the date of 
filing). To be patentable, an innovation must be novel in the sense of not constituting part 
of the prior art or more generally of not being already in the public domain. A patentable 
innovation also must involve an inventive step, meaning that it must be non-obvious to a 
person with ordinary skills in the particular field of application. The innovation also must 
be useful to be patentable; that is, it must permit the solution of a particular problem in at 
least one application. A major element of a patent application is disclosure: the invention 
must be described in sufficient detail to enable those skilled in the particular field to 
practice it. The patent application also lays out specific claims as to the scope of the 
patent itself. The traditional statutory scope of patents—encompassing machines, indus-
trial processes, composition of matter, and articles of manufacture—excluded important 
kinds of scientific discoveries such as laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 
ideas. But recent developments in the use of patents for computer software, information 
technology, and biotechnology innovations are challenging a reductive interpretation of 
such exclusions. See Merges (1997) for further details and a comprehensive treatment of 
U.S. patent law. 
Given that private property is inherently associated with the freedom of choice that 
constitutes the cornerstone of market economies (Barzel 1989), it may seem obvious that 
intangible assets associated with human inventiveness and creativity should enjoy a legal 
status similar to that afforded to the ownership of other more standard goods and ser-
vices. However appealing, this consideration does not quite do justice to the many 
aspects of the economics of patents. There are at least two relevant approaches one can 
take to articulate a fuller discussion of this intellectual property institution: a positive 
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analysis and a normative one. From a positive perspective, we may ask how patents, as 
currently implemented, affect the workings of the economic system. Ultimately we wish 
to understand how the existence of patents affects the allocation of resources to, and the 
distribution of income arising from, inventive activities. A positive economic framework 
also can be used to ask the related question of why patents came to exist. Alternatively, 
from a more normative perspective, we can explore whether the institution of patents is a 
desirable feature of the economic system, and what the features of an optimal patent 
system are. In what follows, we consider these economic questions in more detail, 
focusing on conceptual and theoretical analyses.1   
 
Benefits and Costs of Patents 
 From an economic perspective, the crucial features of patents are that (1) they deal 
with new knowledge, as embodied in an innovative product or process, and (2) they 
confer (limited) monopoly rights to the inventor. New knowledge that makes possible the 
production of new products and/or processes obviously carries considerable economic 
value, but it has features that make it problematic for the market system to handle prop-
erly (Arrow 1962). Specifically, knowledge is a quintessential public good. Pure public 
goods have two basic attributes. First, they are non-rival in consumption, meaning that a 
person’s use of a public good does not affect the amount of it that is available for others. 
Second, they are non-excludable, meaning that it is not possible to prevent individuals 
from enjoying the public good once it is available. An example of a pure public good is 
national defense. It is clear that, absent intellectual property rights, most discoveries and 
inventions would exhibit public good attributes.  
 The problems that a competitive system has with public goods are readily apparent. 
An inventor may bear all the cost of an innovation, but everyone benefits (possibly to 
varying degrees) from a discovery, and thus everyone has an incentive to free ride on the 
innovative efforts of others. The inherent externalities associated with this class of public 
goods generate a market failure: a competitive market system may be expected to provide 
an inefficiently low level of innovations. Intellectual property rights in general, and 
patents in particular, address this problem by attacking the non-appropriability of knowl-
edge that lies at the heart of this market failure. Specifically, by endowing innovators 
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with property rights on their discoveries, patents are a legal means of affecting the 
excludability attributes of an otherwise pure public good.  
 The main economic benefits and costs of the patent system are intimately related to 
the nature of the market failure that it addresses, and to the second-best character of the 
solution that it provides. We begin the discussion of such effects along the taxonomy 
suggested by Mazzoleni and Nelson (1998). 
Patents Can Promote New Discoveries  
 By endowing discoverers with property rights over the fruits of their efforts, patents 
affect the incentive to innovate and are likely to increase the flow of innovations. This 
increase is presumably desirable, given that otherwise the market system may provide too 
little new knowledge. But by giving the patentee exclusive rights on the exploitation of a 
unique economic good that is still non-rival in consumption, a patent creates a monopoly 
situation that adversely affects the efficient use of new knowledge.  
 Nordhaus (1969) and Scherer (1972) provided an early formalization of this funda-
mental trade-off between benefits and costs of the patent system. For a simpler 
illustration, consider the potential market for a new product, say, a new pharmaceutical. 
If p  denotes the price charged to consumers, the latent demand ( )D p  is likely to display 
a choke price p  such that ( ) 0D p =  for all p p³  (there exists a prohibitive price that 
drives demand to zero). Furthermore, this latent demand is downward sloping, i.e., 
( ) 0D p¢ <  for all 0 p p£ <  (a lower price makes the drug attractive to an increasing 
number of potential users).  Suppose that it takes a total cost F  to develop this drug, 
including the testing required for approval, but once this knowledge is available, it takes 
only a unit cost c  to actually manufacture and sell the drug. This situation is represented 
in Figure 1, where demand applies for a specific period (a year, say). Given some qualifi-
cations, area ( )S L+ P +  represents the per-period “social surplus,” i.e., the monetary 
benefits that would accrue to society if this new product were developed (and produced at 
the efficient level Cq ). If the present discounted value of the current and future stream of 
such benefits exceeds the research and development (R&D) cost F , then net benefits are 
possible for society from the introduction of the new drug. But clearly, absent intellectual 
property rights, no individual has an incentive to incur the cost F : the ability of competi- 
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FIGURE 1. Patents and the market for a new product 
 
tors to readily copy the innovation would drive the market price to its unit production 
costs c , and the cost F  cannot be recouped.  
 But with a patent, the innovator becomes a monopolist in the market for the new 
drug and can profit by pricing the drug optimally at Mp , where Mc p p< < . The innova-
tor’s per-period profits are represented by the area P  in Figure 1. If the present 
discounted value of such profits, over the life of the patent, exceeds the R&D cost F , 
then a sufficient incentive exists for this innovation to be brought about, and society as a 
whole enjoys the benefits ( )S + P  for the duration of the patent, and benefits ( )S L+ P +  
thereafter. But note that, during the life of the patent, the innovation is produced at an 
inefficiently low level from a social point of view (i.e., M Cq q< ).2  This brings to the fore 
a fundamental trade-off of the patent system: the balancing between the benefits of 
encouraging additional innovative activities and the costs of forgoing the competitive 
provision of some goods and services. Ex post, that is, given that an innovation is avail-
The Economics of Patents: An Overview / 5 
able, a monopoly is bad from society’s point of view because it restricts uses of the new 
product and/or process (relative to the competitive provision of the innovation). Earlier 
economic analysis focused extensively on this issue and questioned the economic desir-
ability of the patent system (Machlup and Penrose 1950). But the profit opportunity 
created by the monopolistic control of the innovation can be a powerful ex ante incentive, 
presumably enough to motivate R&D investments that would otherwise be neglected.  
Patents Can Help the Dissemination of Knowledge 
 An additional benefit of patents is related to the disclosure requirement. In most 
countries, patents are disclosed 18 months after the filing date or earlier. The importance 
of this feature is predicated on the fact that, absent patents, inventors can rely on trade 
secrets to protect their discoveries (Friedman, Landes, and Posner 1991). By providing an 
incentive for disclosure, patents are held to contribute to a desirable dissemination of 
scientific and technical information, allowing other inventors to avoid duplicating exist-
ing discoveries and making it easier to develop further innovations that build on the 
known state of the arts (possibly by “inventing around” a patent as well). It is useful to 
note that the disclosure argument offers an economic role for patents, even for inventions 
that have already taken place, and as such it is quite distinct from the incentive role of 
patents due to the increased appropriability of R&D output.  
Patents Can Avoid Wasteful Innovation Efforts 
 As the arguments on the disclosure property of patents suggest, an important and 
beneficial effect of new knowledge is that it makes possible further innovations and 
discoveries. Discoveries from basic research are often of this sort, at times opening up 
entire new fields of research. It can be argued that patenting of such seminal inventions 
can have useful social payoffs. This rationale is articulated in the so-called prospect 
theory of patents, originated by Kitch (1977). It relies on the notion that broad, early 
property rights on key inventions allow an orderly pursuit of follow-up innovations and 
reduce wasteful innovation races. An analogy can be made to the practice of granting 
mineral claims on land where no discovery has yet been made, to avoid a wasteful mining 
of the prospect. Whereas patents in such cases can clearly have positive efficiency 
effects, it is also easy to see that broad, early patents can adversely affect further research, 
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especially when the original discovery has applicability in many uses. If the original 
inventor does not have a comparative research advantage or interest in pursuing some 
research directions, and licensing of the patented innovation to third parties is problem-
atic (perhaps because of excessive transaction costs), patenting can have adverse effects 
on the flow of further innovations. We will return to related issues later when discussing 
the appropriate breadth of patents.  
Patents Can Help Technology Transfer and Commercialization 
 Whereas the difficulty of licensing may reduce the desirability of exceedingly broad 
property rights, patents can actually play a critical role in licensing and, more generally, 
in the dissemination of new knowledge. A key insight here is due to Arrow (1962), who 
stressed the information nature of new knowledge and noted a peculiar property in the 
determination of demand for information. Specifically, to put a value on information a 
would-be purchaser needs to have the information, but at that point, if the seller does not 
have property rights on the information, the would-be buyer has no more incentive to pay 
for it. Patents, therefore, can play a crucial role in reducing transaction costs of licensing 
innovation and, more generally, in technology transfer.  
 A related but distinct role for patents as instruments of technology transfer has been 
articulated to rationalize the Patent and Trademark Laws Amendments of 1980, com-
monly known as the Bayh-Dole Act. The main elements of this reform were to allow 
universities and other entities to patent, retain title to, and commercialize federally funded 
inventions; and, to allow federal agencies to grant exclusive licensing for their inventions. 
Based on the view that the main role of patents is to provide incentives for innovation 
that would not occur otherwise, it would be difficult to make an economic case for public 
institutions patenting discoveries that already have been publicly funded and accom-
plished. Likewise, the role of patents in transferring information would be irrelevant in 
this case, because public research institutions have little use for trade secrets, and because 
it is difficult to improve on the dissemination of information achieved by simply publish-
ing a discovery. But the presumption here is that many discoveries produced by publicly 
funded R&D, and in the public domain, may not be used in technological developments 
because, without an exclusive license backed up by patent rights, firms would not be 
interested in expensive development work required to transform an invention into a new 
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product. Little evidence exists to corroborate this belief for the case of university patent-
ing (Mowery et al. 2001). But more generally, when it is difficult to assert property rights 
on development work, a patent on underlying innovations obviously may aid develop-
ment and commercialization of new technologies. 
 
Length and Scope of Patent Protection 
 As illustrated in the foregoing, the patent system entails a fundamental trade-off—
inventors are given a monopoly position (which entails inefficiencies) in order to provide 
them with incentives to innovate (which carries economic benefits).3 In other words, the 
dynamic efficiency of encouraging invention leads to static inefficiency created by a 
monopolistic situation. Given that, a natural question to ask is, what is the optimal degree 
of patent protection? The degree of market power provided by a patent essentially depends 
on three elements: the length (duration) of the patent, the breadth of the patent, and the 
height of the patent. We analyze these features of patent protection for the case of a single 
innovation first, and consider the issues related to cumulative innovations later on. 
Duration of the Monopoly Power 
 The length of the patent determines the duration of monopoly power that a patentee 
can expect and thus affects the static inefficiency as well as the incentive role of patents. 
The benefit to the innovator increases with the length of the patent. But from society’s 
point of view, too short a patent may dissuade research, whereas a patent that is too long 
may give excessive rent to the owner and may block further improvement.  
 Consider first a given innovation, such as the new product case illustrated in Figure 1, 
where P  denotes the per-period profit accruing to the patentee. Here, the optimal dura-
tion of the patent should be determined so as to recoup exactly the R&D expenditure 
necessary to bring about the innovation. Then, for a discount rate r , and given a one-time 
research cost F  of bringing about the innovation, the optimal patent length *T  would 
solve 
*
0
T rte dt F-P =ò .  A more realistic model would allow the size of the innovation to 
vary with the investment in R&D, which in turn depends on the length of the patent. For 
simplicity, think of a process innovation that leads to a reduction in the unit cost of 
producing a good. The optimal patent length must now balance the social gain from the  
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innovation due to a larger reduction in cost and the social loss associated with a longer 
delay in the exploitation of the innovation by rival firms. This point was originally made 
by Nordhaus (1969), who found that an optimal patent must be of finite duration but 
strictly positive, as shown later by Scherer (1972).  
In these earlier models, it was assumed that R&D investment always leads to an in-
novation the size of which depends on the investment undertaken and where an R&D 
project necessarily succeeds. This is a restrictive assumption that does not take into  
account competition at the R&D level. The introduction of such competition can, under 
certain circumstances, increase the optimal length. Indeed, the expected payoff of each 
competitor is reduced; therefore, for a given number of competitors, an increase in the 
patent duration may be the only way to reestablish the R&D incentive (Kamien and 
Schwartz 1974). But in other circumstances, competition can reduce the required patent 
length, as is the case in DeBrock’s (1985) model where it is assumed that competition 
takes place at the research level and not at the development level where patent holders 
can develop their innovation without threat of competition. Here, R&D investment at the 
development stage is the same as without competition, but competition at the research 
level leads to useless duplication of costs for firms that cannot get a patent, and that in 
turn reduces the social surplus. 
 The industrial context may play an important role in the determination of the optimal 
patent length. For instance, in markets where demand is very elastic (i.e., quantity de-
manded is very responsive to a small change in price), monopolistic pricing of the 
innovation can lead to large ex post welfare losses (i.e., a large L  in Figure 1). Hence, in 
such markets a shorter patent length would be warranted. The optimal patent length is 
also likely to be innovation-specific, and thus the one-size-fits-all patent length (20 years 
from filing) is sub-optimal. Roughly speaking, a uniform patent length provides too much 
protection for “easy” innovations (those that would have been pursued even with a 
shorter patent period), thereby creating unnecessary efficiency losses, whereas it provides 
too little protection for “difficult” innovations, such that some research projects that are 
socially desirable do not get undertaken.4 
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The Scope of a Patent 
 Whereas the length of the patent protection characterizes the duration of the monop-
oly power, the scope of a patent bears on the intensity of the induced monopoly power 
(Merges and Nelson 1990). The breadth of a patent defines the range of products that are 
encompassed by the claims of the patent and therefore protects the patent holder against 
potential imitators. In general, the less specific the claims of the patent are, the broader 
the patent. The height of a patent, on the other hand, confers protection against improve-
ments or applications that are easy or trivial. The value of a patent to a firm depends on 
how effective its protection is in these two dimensions (breadth and height), in addition to 
being related monotonically to the patent length.  
 Unlike its maximum length, which is fixed by law, patent breadth is, to a certain 
extent, endogenous. Patent breadth depends on the claims put forth by the patentee and 
also is a feature over which the patent office has some discretion (at the examination 
stage).5 Clearly, a reduction in the breadth of patents would induce more competition 
(e.g., imitation), which benefits consumers. But too narrow a patent reduces the incentive 
to innovate. What is the optimal breadth for patents? Economic analysis suggests two 
kinds of results in this setting. Narrow and long patents can be found to be optimal 
because broad patents are costly for society in that they give excessive monopoly power 
to the patent holder (Gilbert and Shapiro 1990). Central to this conclusion is that the flow 
of payoff from holding a patent has a negative impact on the social surplus. Thus, a 
minimum level of flow of payoff (breadth), with duration adjusted accordingly, would be 
socially optimal. In Klemperer’s (1990) more general model, both narrow and long, or 
broad and short, patents can be optimal, depending on the structure of demand. Broad and 
short patents can also be optimal when they discourage imitation and thus enhance the 
incentive to innovate (Gallini 1992). Specifically, imitation is discouraged when it is too 
costly (broad patent) and when imitators do not have enough time to enter the market 
(short patent).  
 Denicolò (1996) analyzes these alternative conditions in a single model in which the 
problem is to minimize a ratio of social loss to the incentive to innovate. The breadth 
influences both the elements of the ratio, and, depending on the assumptions about the 
nature of competition in these markets, all the above results can be found. Thus, in 
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different industries, different optimal patent policy could be enforced. Patents in biotech-
nology should be different from patents in e-commerce, for example. Note that in these 
models, patent length and the scope of protection are substitutes for the purpose of 
providing a given level of protection to the innovator. This is not necessarily the case 
when we consider cumulative innovations, as we will see below.  
 Another dimension of the patent right is the protection it gives to the innovator 
against improvements that are too close to the patented innovation. This feature is some-
times referred to as the novelty requirement, also called “height” (van Dijk 1992) or 
“leading breadth” (O’Donoghue, Scotchmer, and Thisse 1998). Competition from follow-
up innovations are clearly affected by the height of the patent, and too high a patent gives 
excessive monopoly power to the patent holder. As for the interaction between height and 
duration, La Manna (1992) shows that a patent of infinite duration and finite height can 
be optimal. 
 In conclusion, patent scope (breadth and height) can substitute for patent length in 
providing ex post returns from (and therefore ex ante incentive for) an innovation. But 
one should not conclude that broader or higher patents necessarily induce more research. 
The problem is that, ex ante, a potential inventor needs to consider the possibility of 
discovering something that may infringe on existing patents. The broader or higher the 
patents, the greater the risk of such a possible unwanted infringement, and this possibility 
can discourage R&D investments. As discussed in the foregoing, specific conclusions 
about optimal patents are sensitive to the way one chooses to model the innovation 
process. Also, the degree of substitutability between length, breadth, and height of a 
patent depends on the nature of the innovation. Currently, there seems to be widespread 
concern about exceedingly broad patents being granted, particularly in recent innovation 
fields such as biotechnology and so-called business methods (Merges 1999). This is 
particularly the case for cumulative innovations, when an innovation is useful mostly as a 
research tool in other R&D activities.  
Cumulative Innovations 
 The importance of patent height is most apparent for the case of sequential innova-
tions. Such innovations are particularly relevant when the innovation is a research tool, 
used mainly in the R&D process for further innovations. Consider first the case of a basic 
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innovation followed by its improvement, which eventually can be accomplished by the 
same innovator. What is the impact of the scope of the protection in the diffusion of 
innovations over time? Scotchmer and Green (1990) focus on the profit incentive for 
R&D when the second innovation is more profitable than the first one (from social and 
private viewpoints) and when there exists an information externality among innovators 
(patent disclosure confers a positive externality on the innovator’s competitors). The 
policy question here is to determine how stringent the novelty requirement should be in 
order to protect the profit of innovators while encouraging disclosure of innovation. It is 
presumed that the reasons for granting a patent are to create an incentive to do research 
and to accelerate aggregate innovation through disclosure of innovations. The first reason 
calls for a strong novelty requirement (any small improvement should be found to 
infringe upon the patented innovation and thus protect fully the first innovator), whereas 
the second reason calls for a weak novelty requirement.  
 Because the information externality that the innovator may want to avoid is due to 
the disclosure requirement of patents, the innovator may prefer to keep small innovations 
secret. The strategic suppression of small improvements can avoid the ex ante erosion of 
profit due to a weak novelty requirement (Scotchmer and Green 1990). The weak novelty 
requirement seems to be socially preferable because an early disclosure accelerates the 
introduction of the improvement. Nevertheless, even in this system, the first innovation is 
not always patented. When the ex ante profit is larger with the strong novelty require-
ment, this last system is socially preferable. In any case, the first innovator can choose 
not to patent the innovation. One way to force firms to disclose their small innovations 
without undermining their profit would be to force them to cooperate. This could take the 
form of licensing (Green and Scotchmer 1995; Scotchmer 1991). In the same vein, 
Matutes, Regibeau, and Rockett (1996) show that a system based on an optimal height 
rather than an optimal length is socially preferable because it induces an earlier introduc-
tion of the innovation. 
 However, it is not always the case that the first innovator is able to improve on her 
innovation or even to develop applications. For instance, small laboratories that do not 
have access to sufficient capital may be unable to perform further development. In this 
setting, what is the appropriate patent scope that gives enough incentive to the first and 
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second innovators to undertake R&D investment? Let us first assume that only one firm 
is capable of being the second innovator. In this setting, each innovator should receive an 
incentive at the level of the social benefit she creates. For the second innovator, it should 
be the incremental benefit created by her improvement, whereas for the first innovator, it 
should be the sum of the first innovation benefit and the incremental benefit. Indeed, the 
feasibility of the second innovation is due to the very existence of the first one. For this 
reason, the actual profit-sharing arrangement between innovators is important. If profit 
sharing is in favor of the first innovator it will promote radical innovations, whereas if it 
is in favor of the second innovator it will promote improvements.  
 It is nevertheless very difficult to favor improvement if the first innovation has no 
value by itself (but is fundamental to the discovery of the second innovation). On the 
other hand, a policy in favor of the first innovator will reduce follow-up improvements 
and will thus affect the profit of the first innovator. Public authorities have two ways to 
intervene in the profit-sharing process: through the scope of the patent (height, length, or 
patentability of the second generation of innovations), and through the competitive policy 
in regard to licenses. Green and Scotchmer (1995) present a situation in which it is 
profitable for innovators to sign ex ante license agreements. They show that an infinite 
height (i.e., any second-generation innovators need to get a license from the original 
innovator) is optimal when there is certainty about the return of the second generation of 
innovations. In the case of uncertainty, that is no longer the case. 
 Scotchmer (1991) explores the role of the patentability of the second generation of 
innovations when the improvement of the initial innovation can be done by more than 
one firm. The very existence of competition to obtain the second patent reduces the 
expected profit of the first innovator and thus reduces the attractiveness of the ex ante 
license. An ex ante license agreement can be impossible to implement in situations where 
the second generation of innovators are reluctant to disclose their ideas for improvement 
to the first innovator. Chang (1995) considers this situation and shows that, no matter 
what the value of the first innovation, there exists a threshold value for the second 
innovation below which a license is required and above which it is not required. The 
smaller the benefit of the first innovation, the higher must be the patent in order to 
provide enough incentive to the first innovator. But optimal patent height is not a mono-
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tonic function of the social value of the first innovation, and when this value is large, the 
patent also must be high. 
 To fully capture the impact of the cumulative nature of the innovations on the 
incentive to innovate, it is useful to consider a dynamic model where improvements of 
the innovation arise randomly (O’Donoghue, Scotchmer, and Thisse 1998). In this 
setting, the innovators must be protected against improvements (leading breadth or 
height) and against imitations (lagging breadth or breadth). Here it is assumed that the 
probability that the same innovator makes two successive improvements is almost nil. 
Depending on the rate at which improvement ideas arise, under a perfect lagging breadth, 
innovators may overinvest or underinvest. They will tend to underinvest if ideas are too 
frequent because they fear that another improvement will be introduced too early. But if 
ideas are not that frequent, firms will overinvest because each innovator expects to 
increase her payoff once she becomes a follower after having been a leader. With a 
maximal lagging breadth, and if leading breadth is finite but duration is infinite, firms 
underinvest in R&D. An infinite duration for a low patent reduces the cost associated 
with the delay in diffusion (O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse 1998). 
 Thus, when innovation is cumulative, the acceleration of the disclosure of the first 
innovation is crucial to allow further improvements. However, this must be done without 
altering the incentives of the first innovator. Furthermore, when innovations are cumula-
tive, their complementarity gives rise to additional issues. 
Complementary Innovations 
 To manufacture a complex new product (e.g., a computer chip or a transgenic crop), 
it is common for firms to need a number of intermediate inputs that are patented, with 
such patent rights likely held by different firms. Insofar as the patented inputs are highly 
complementary, or even essential, in the manufacture of the new product, the suppliers of 
these inputs essentially hold blocking patents. The danger then is that the manufacturer 
becomes susceptible to hold-up by the patentees (Shapiro 2001). In the context of bio-
technology innovations, this problem has been characterized as the “tragedy of the 
anticommons” (Heller and Eisenberg 1998). Recall that the standard notion of tragedy of 
the commons refers to the overuse of a common property resource, and it arises because 
not enough property rights are allocated. The tragedy of the anticommons situation arises 
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because, somewhat paradoxically, there is an excess allocation of property rights (i.e., too 
many gatekeepers with the right to levy a tax), and this situation can lead to an underuse 
of the resource (in this case, the pool of knowledge).  
 The hold-up problem when patented innovations are complements can be quite 
damaging to the functioning of the patent system. The issue here is mostly one of coordi-
nation among patent holders. Mechanisms that can address the hold-up problem in this 
setting include cross-licensing and patent pools. With cross-licensing, which can be 
implemented with or without license fees, two (or more) firms agree to share a subset of 
each other’s patented technologies. This kind of arrangement is particularly attractive 
when the relevant patents are held by the manufacturers of the new product that needs the 
complementary patented inputs. Cross-licensing is apparently quite common between 
firms engaged in the design and manufacture of microprocessors, for example. A patent 
pool is an arrangement whereby a set of patents is licensed in a single package, for a 
posted fee, either by a single owner or by an entity especially set up to handle this ar-
rangement. The obvious danger here is that, whereas the inclusion of complementary 
patents in the pool is justifiable (as detailed in the foregoing discussion) and leads to pro-
competitive behavior, the inclusion of substitute (rival) patents in the pool could be a 
means to implement collusion and could exacerbate noncompetitive behavior. Patent 
pools, therefore, can pose antitrust issues. Another way to reduce the fragmentation of 
patent ownership is through mergers and acquisitions, and that, indeed, appears to be one 
of the driving forces behind the recent industry consolidation in the life sciences sector. 
 
Patents, Market Structure, and the Incentive for R&D 
 The research activity of innovators undoubtedly is influenced by the patent system, as 
well as by the industry structure. To gain some insights into the interaction of patents and 
industry structure, we explore how innovators invest in R&D. Note first that the discovery 
of an innovation affects the structure of the market. This is easy to understand if we con-
sider a process innovation that allows reducing production costs: firms can compete in the 
pre-innovation and, if a patent is granted, the holder will be a monopolist in the post-
innovation market. Competition can also take place at the R&D level. The notion that firms 
may be competing at the innovation stage has been a recurring one in this paper. This 
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competition is very much affected by the patent system, which has the feature of a winner-
takes-all contest. To analyze the effects that this may have on R&D, recall that the pre-
sumption is that, absent patents, economic agents do not have sufficient incentives to invest 
in R&D activities and, consequently, not enough innovation activity would take place. The 
term of comparison here is usually the “socially optimal” level of R&D activities, which 
one can define (at least conceptually) taking into account the overall expected benefits 
brought about by an innovation, as well as the costs of R&D projects. This first-best 
solution typically cannot be achieved by a decentralized market system, for lack of incen-
tives and coordination mechanisms (the “market failure” predicament), and it cannot be 
achieved by a centralized government either, for lack of information and implementation 
mechanisms. Given these benchmarks, the patent system is likely to increase private 
investments towards the first-best (socially optimal) level of R&D. 
 To isolate the pure incentive to innovate (that is, without any competition at the 
innovation stage), it is necessary to note that the value of an innovation to an inventor 
depends on the nature of the innovation but also on the market structure that applies at the 
production stage (Arrow 1962). Monopoly and competition provide useful polar cases. It 
turns out that, ceteris paribus, the incentive to innovate is lower in a monopolistic market 
than in a competitive market. This is due to the replacement effect: a monopolist has less 
to gain from a given innovation (say, a cost-reducing innovation) because one monopolis-
tic situation replaces another monopolistic situation. But even under competitive 
production conditions the incentive to innovate is less than what is socially optimal. This 
latter case is actually depicted in Figure 1, which can be interpreted as representing a 
market where competitive producers with unit cost c  must pay a royalty to the inventor. 
In this situation it is optimal for the inventor to set the royalty rate at ( )Mp c- , and thus 
the incentive to innovate is the profit P . However, from society’s perspective, the 
incentive to innovate ought to be the entire (potential) consumer surplus ( )S L+ P + . 
 What is missing from the foregoing analysis is the possibility of entry in the innova-
tion industry; typically it is possible (and likely) for more than one firm to pursue the 
same research result. The resulting “patent race” tends to dissipate the expected rent from 
patenting and to increase aggregate R&D investment (in a fashion akin to the “common 
pool” problem of competitive fishing in an open access fishery). To see what some of the 
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implications might be, following Wright (1983) and Tandon (1983), suppose that n  firms 
pursue the same invention. Each firm incurs a one-time research cost F . Let ( )P n  
represent the probability that the invention takes place (at least one firm is successful). In 
general, more firms increase the aggregate success probability but at a decreasing rate 
(i.e., ( ) 0P n¢ >  and ( ) 0P n¢¢ < ). For simplicity, assume that the social benefits from the 
discovery are equal to the private benefits that accrue to the inventor, say B . From a 
social point of view, the optimal number of firms *n  that pursue the invention should 
maximize the expected net social benefit and thus should solve *( )P n B F¢ =  (i.e., ex-
pected marginal social benefit = marginal social cost). But because each individual firm 
has an incentive to join the patent race as long as the expected profit is greater than the 
cost F  (under risk neutrality), the equilibrium number of firms Cn  in competition solves 
( )C CP n B n F= . Given the properties of the aggregate probability function ( )P n , it then 
must be that *Cn n> , and therefore excessive resources are allocated to R&D by this 
patent race.  
 Consider now the dimension of time and suppose that the date of discovery of the 
invention is a decreasing function with the investment in research (Dasgupta and Stiglitz 
1980), and assume that the investment is completely paid at date zero. The pre-innovation 
situation is competitive, and only the firm that first makes the innovation will be granted 
a patent (monopolistic post-innovation situation). This situation is similar to an auction in 
which at date zero the patent will be granted to the firm that proposes to innovate first. In 
this setting, only one firm will invest exactly the amount that it will gain from innovating. 
The deterministic nature of the relationship between the date of discovery and the invest-
ment makes it easy to find that the investment undertaken by a monopolist is smaller than 
the investment undertaken by competitive firms. Furthermore, the monopolist invests less 
than that which is socially optimal. This is due to the negative externality of the invest-
ment of an innovator on her rivals, which none of the firms internalize. 
 In this setting, what happens to the incentives to innovate if a potential entrant can 
introduce the innovation instead of the incumbent? In other words, do technological 
innovations come from a monopolist in the pre-innovation market or from new innova-
tors? The pure incentive to invest is higher for potential entrants, due to the replacement 
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effect. But there is another effect that has to be considered: the efficiency effect that 
arises because the profit of a monopoly is bigger than the sum of the duopoly profits. 
Thus, a monopolist has more to lose when a competitor enters the post-innovation market 
compared to a potential entrant. This leads to preemption (Gilbert and Newbery 1982) 
and to the persistence of monopoly.  
 Now we add one more degree of realism and consider not only that discovery 
depends on the R&D investment but also that it is random, as in the case of “patent race” 
models with stochastic innovation (Loury, 1979; Lee and Wilde 1980; Reinganum 1989). 
The date of discovery is no longer deterministic but random according to a Poisson 
process. The investment can be fixed and incurred at the beginning (Loury 1979), or it 
can be incurred as a constant flow over time (Lee and Wilde 1980). The advantage of the 
second model is that firms can stop to invest as soon as a rival has made a discovery. 
These models have no memory: the probability of success does not vary as time goes by 
or as investment is accumulated. Each firm considers only its own marginal benefit and 
does not take into account the reduction that its own investment will impose on its rival’s 
payoff. It is not known when a discovery will be made (technological uncertainty), nor 
who will make it (market uncertainly). Loury (1979) shows that as the number of firms 
that compete increases, the average optimal investment decreases. On the contrary, in the 
model of Lee and Wilde (1980), it increases. The difference in results is due to the 
different structure of investment. Nevertheless, for a given number of firms engaged in 
the race, firms tend to overinvest in R&D compared to the socially optimal level in both 
models. Thus, there is a tendency for excessive research.  
 In this setting, do monopolists have a stronger incentive to invest than do potential 
entrants? Which effect (replacement or efficiency) dominates the other depends on the 
nature of the innovation. For an innovation that is almost drastic, a monopolist invests 
less than a potential entrant and thus preemption disappears (Reinganum 1983).6 There is 
no efficiency effect anymore; only the replacement effect plays a role. When the firm 
behind in the race can leapfrog, or when the process is without memory (i.e., at each 
point in time the probabilities of winning are the same for each firm), there is no preemp-
tion (Fudenberg et al. 1983). On the other hand, when it is not possible to leapfrog, as is 
the case in Gilbert and Newbery (1982), then there is always persistence of monopoly. 
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 Thus, firms engaged in a patent race may collectively invest more than that which is 
socially desirable. Furthermore, firms engaged in a patent race are likely to choose 
research strategies that are too risky. Because the race is essentially a winner-takes-all 
contest, there is a clear payoff to being first, but the penalty for losing does not depend on 
how far behind a firm ends up. And firms will tend to choose research projects that, from 
a social perspective, display too much correlation (i.e., there is too much duplication of 
research efforts) (Dasgupta and Maskin 1987). To illustrate this last point, suppose that it 
is socially desirable for a particular firm to choose a research direction very different 
from that of its competitors (because that would increase the probability of someone 
being successful). The reason an individual firm may not want to follow such a (socially 
optimal) strategy is because by doing so it would increase the probability that a competi-
tor is successful in instances when the firm is not. 
 
Beyond Patents 
 The main justification for patents is to foster innovation in a market economy, but 
the patent system is not the only method for encouraging innovation. Copyrights and 
trademarks, of course, are additional instruments for intellectual property right protection 
that typically apply in contexts where patents do not. Trade secrets, on the other hand, 
can apply to patentable innovations and can provide effective protection against another 
party’s discovery by inappropriate means (although a trade secret offers no protection 
against independent discovery or reverse engineering). Certain biological innovations are 
also afforded sui generis protection by such means as plant patents and plant variety 
protection certificates (Barton 1998).   
 More generally, alternatives to patents include rewards or prizes, procurement con-
tracts, and public production of new knowledge. With the reward system, the government 
specifies a fixed sum of money for a well-defined research goal and then awards this 
“prize” to the first firm to achieve the desired result. Asymmetric information between 
researchers and the government can make it difficult to implement the reward mechanism 
(Wright 1983). Specifically, to be effective, the government must know about the feasi-
bility of various research projects as well as be able to assess the demand for various 
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potential innovations. But firms are likely to be better informed than the government on 
such matters, and a decentralized solution such as the patent system may be superior.  
 With the procurement system, the government picks the firms that will be involved 
in the research project and specifies the terms of the project (such as expected research 
output and compensation terms) in a binding contract (Laffont and Tirole 1993). Unlike 
the prize system, this method can eliminate unwanted duplication of research efforts. But 
again, for this system to be efficient, the government must be quite knowledgeable about 
the costs and benefits of research ventures.7 More generally, innovations can be stimu-
lated by the government’s direct involvement in the production of new knowledge. Much 
of the research carried out at public institutions, and sponsored by public funds, is an 
example of such knowledge production. This structure, together with the complex social 
milieu characterizing academic institutions, has made possible the “open science” envi-
ronment that can take substantial credit for many scientific and technological 
breakthroughs (Stephan 1996; David 1998). The tension between the behavioral stan-
dards of open science and the privatization of new knowledge made possible by patents is 
readily apparent. The concern is that the increased reliance on intellectual property right 
mechanisms may be eroding the domain of public information and access to research 
tools, which could have serious long-term consequences for the vitality of the community 
of science (David 2000). 
 
Conclusion 
 The patent system has emerged as the central institution for asserting intellectual 
property rights in many crucial fields of science and technology. From an economic point 
of view, patents offer a second-best solution to the market failure arising from the public-
good nature of knowledge. As such, the patent system contributes to solving a problem 
but comes with shortcomings of its own, mostly because it creates market power posi-
tions that can adversely affect the economic performance of the system. In fact, for most 
of the nineteenth century, the patent system was under considerable criticism by the same 
economics profession that now provides the most valuable insights for its defense. This 
change is due to the increased appreciation for the critical role that innovations play in 
stimulating economic growth. The possibility of protecting discoveries through patents, 
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for example, is credited for bringing about crucial technical improvements in the indus-
trial revolution (Dutton 1984).   
As noted, the ex post inefficiency of the patent system is viewed as the necessary 
downside in providing enough inducement to undertake desirable R&D projects. The size 
of the inducement depends on the length and scope of the patent right. Ideally, such an 
inducement should be proportional to the cost of the R&D project, which means that the 
length, breadth, and height of a patent should be tailored to each particular innovation. In 
addition to the cost of the project, such a tailored patent should also reflect the particular 
market conditions of the new product and/or process. Clearly, the patent system does not 
do that, and arguably it cannot do that. These limitations suggest that continued efforts 
are required to improve the workings of the patent system. A solid understanding of its 
complex (and sometime subtle) economic implications, which we have tried to review 
here, should prove useful in this endeavor. 
  
 
 
 
Endnotes 
1. Although this body of work reflects accepted stylized facts and empirical findings, as well as the 
evolving legal and institutional features of the patent system, there is also a distinct and large set of 
empirical studies on the economics of patents that we will not review here. 
2. Here, S  measures the consumer surplus while the patent is active, and ( )S L+ P +  is the consumer 
surplus after the patent has expired. Thus, L  is the “loss” to society from underutilizing the innovation 
during the life of the patent. 
3. Here and in what follows, we do not distinguish between the incentive to create and the incentive to 
commercialize an innovation.  
4. These considerations are somewhat tempered by the fact that effectively different patent lengths can be 
implemented through the imposition of different renewal fees (Cornelli and Schankerman 1999). In 
most European countries, patent holders must pay an annual renewal fee in order to keep their patents in 
force. In the United States, only three renewal fees have to be paid: at patent ages 3, 7, and 11. 
5. In U.S. case law, breadth and height of a patent also are upheld by the so-called doctrine of equivalents, 
which asserts that a new product that is outside the stated claims of an existing patent could still infringe 
on this patent if it is essentially an equivalent product. 
6. As in Arrow (1962), an innovation is “drastic” if its pricing is not affected by the threat of competition 
(the innovator can behave as an unrestricted monopolist).  
7. This issue may be less problematic when the government is the only intended customer of the innova-
tion, as happens, for example, with research related to national defense.
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